Gender selection
by Tom Temple
15 September 2009
Saletan just posted an article about gender selection that reminded me a lot one I wrote.
In retrospect, my position was insufficiently nuanced to completely answer Bill’s question, so I’d like to clarify it.
I think that all the stated techniques are “okay” which should be interpreted as “should be left legally permisable.” From the context it should be clear that there is an ordering of preference going increasing from later abortions up to special condom. I guess you could say that this preference is “moral”. I like to think though that my system of ethics is more straightforward than that though.
So let me briefly write out Tom’s system of Ethics, (TSE).
Assume there is some global function (subject to restrictions that are beyond the scope of this article) that assigns values to various outcomes. An action’s “goodness” would simply the expected change of this global function. However, we cannot globally agree on this function.
Assume that we can somehow establish “robust consensus” on some convex family of functions. Any action with expectation greater or equal to zero for some function in the interior of this family is “permisable.” We can define a partial order such that an action is “better” if and only if there does not exist a function in the family which contradicts this preference. But this is not a full order, and certain preferences will be left to personal measurement.
We could try to define universal goodness in terms of measures over this family, but that’s what I would call “hide the potato”—agreeing on measures will be no easier than agreeing on a global objective.
