Residency Matching
by Tom Temple
29 September 2009
A few of my friends are going through residency matching with hospitals right now and by coincidence we ended up discussing that very problem in an optimization class.
The problem, as posed, is to find a perfect stable matching. The simple explanation is they are trying to find any matching such that there is no pair of assignments in which the two hospitals and two students would (all four) prefer to switch. This has little to do with optimality, except for that if anything were changed, at least one player would be worse off. It is notable that the classic version of the algorithm would produce a matching that favored one group or the other. In the residency problem, I wonder which is given the preference?...
The main point of this post is just to point interested people to that Wikipedia article. Beyond that, more recent scholarship has identified a number of nice properties of the problem (e.g. there exists a self-dual linear relaxation), which make it easier than it looks to find feasible assignments. As a result, I’m suddenly quite suspicious that DOC trips could effectively use commercial optimization software for trip assignments. That would be fun—perhaps even more fun than doing it by hand. Remember that, guys?
